This second volume arising from the Frontiers in American Philosophy Conference held at Texas A&M University is "festive, celebrating the diversity of thought and influences in American philosophy," say its editors. In these thirty-six essays, there is no attempt to define an American ethos; in fact, the editors conclude that, even pragmatism, identified by Tocqueville as America's defining attribute, should not be described as a national philosophy. It is, as Gerard Deledalle notes in his essay, "the new universal philosophy, because (...) it is the philosophy of experience and democracy that is any nation's `manifest destiny.'" These articles, by thoughtful scholars from North America and several European nations, look forward through the developments presently shaping philosophical inquiry in the United States and backward to the origins and plurality of the American intellectual heritage. Not a parochial or narrow perspective, the focus on American philosophy sharpens the dialogue that clarifies and explicates American thought in the context of a world community. (shrink)

To push the edges of the known, to look at the accepted in novel ways, is indeed to stand at the frontiers of a field. In Frontiers in American Philosophy thirty-five contemporary scholars explore classical American thought in bold new ways. An extraordinary range of issues and thinkers is represented in these pages--from such core themes as metaphysics and social philosophy, which receive primary attention, to some consideration of American philosophers' technical accomplishments in mathematical logic and philosophical analysis. The authors (...) also offer new perspectives on the work of the leading American philosophers, including George Herbert Mead, William James, John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Emma Goldman. Not surprisingly perhaps, a great deal of the discussion revolves, either directly or indirectly, around that great axis of intellectual issues commonly known as the "realism/idealism" controversy. It seems fitting that so much attention is devoted to the possibility of some sort of middle position between "external realism" and its antipode in some form of relativistic subjectivism. For, in the last analysis, such a middle position is for the American philosophers the core meaning of "pragmatism.”. (shrink)

This paper argues that several important tenets of the so-called "new theory of reference"--also known as the "historical-explanation theory" and as the "causal theory" of reference--were developed by william james as early as 1885 and that by 1895 they were elaborated by him in no less detail than contemporary theorists have so far done. these tenets include the central doctrine that reference is dependent on a causal or historical-explanatory chain connecting the act of referring with the entity referred to. james' (...) theory of reference is argued to be an aspect of his theory of truth. reference in james is argued to be an aspect of his pragmatic conception of the "workings" of true ideas. (shrink)

Lines of identity in Peirce's existential graphs are logically complex structures that comprise both identity and existential quantification. Yet geometrically they are simple: linear continua that cannot have “furcations” or cross “cuts.” By contrast Peirce's “ligatures” are geometrically complex: they can both have furcations and cross cuts. Logically they involve not only identity and existential quantification but also negation. Moreover, Peirce makes clear that ligatures are composed of lines of identity by virtue of the fact that such lines can be (...) “connected” with one another and can “abut upon” one another at a cut. This paper shows in logical detail how ligatures are composed and how they relate to identity, existential quantification, and negation. In so doing, it makes use of Peirce's non-standard account of the linear continuum, according to which, when a linear continuum is separated into two parts, the parts are symmetric rather than asymmetric, and the one point at which separation occurs actually becomes two points, each of which is a Doppelgänger of the other. (shrink)

Most of the competent Nietzsche interpreters concede that there are two major strands of his thought that do not seem to sit comfortably with each other. The one strand affirms the primacy and irreducibility of interpretation, according to which the world admits of countless meanings with no extra-interpretive measure to decide among them. With this strand is associated Nietzsche’s so-called perspectivism, antifoundationalism, and genealogical method. The other strand calls for a “return to nature and naturalness”, enjoining us to “recognize” what (...) Nietzsche calls the “eternal original text homo natura ”. With this strand is associated Nietzsche’s doctrines of becoming and will to power. However, if there are no facts, only interpretations, direct appeal to the “facts” of nature as a claim to know unmediated reality in itself would be ruled out. Conversely, if the goal is to recognize nature just as it is in itself, then perforce all interpretations and perspectives would fall short of truth. Apparently, Nietzsche cannot have it both ways. Yet, apparently, neither can he have it just one way or the other. For simply to affirm that there are only interpretations would threaten to collapse into a self-defeating relativism; whereas simply to appeal to pure unmediated “facts ‘in themselves’” would contravene the very condition of such “facts” being known “in themselves,” since being known is being in relation. (shrink)

Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A chronological edition, volume 4, 1879?1884. Editor [in Chiefl, Christian J. W. Kloesel. Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989. lxx + 698 pp. $57.50.

The book explores three specific areas: the practice of writing with respect to orality; the interpretive modes of poetic and philosophical discourse as self ...

This volume is a contribution to the on-going debate over Heidegger’s Nazi involvement. Among those who would represent this debate juridically, there now seems to be general agreement concerning the quid facti. Lang does not claim to “disclose new information about Heidegger’s history,... or to draw on material previously unpublished”. Instead, by taking a particular perspective on already available information, he presumes to “shed new light on... [Heidegger’s] relation to Nazism as well as on the broader connection between Heidegger’s political (...) stance and his ‘professional’ philosophical thought”. Specifically, Lang “looks at Heidegger ‘through’ the Jewish Question”, and the fact of Heidegger’s virtual silence about it. He argues that this silence is neither accidental nor insignificant, but expressive of a basic pattern, according to which Heidegger’s political persona and philosophical work converge. This is a weak version of the thesis that “Heidegger’s political views and conduct were malign and that they were imbedded in his ‘deeper’ philosophical work”. It does not “assert a necessary or intrinsic connection between the philosophy and the politics,” but only a “dispositional relation”. The claim is that Heidegger’s approaches to philosophical and political matters are not logically implicated but, so to speak, mutually attuned, consonant with the whole tenor and tone of his thinking and person. To support this dispositional thesis, Lang presents corroborating evidence of Heidegger’s antisemitism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Signs of Logic: Peircean Themes on the Philosophy of Language, Games, and CommunicationRobert W. BurchAhti-Veikko Pietarinen Signs of Logic: Peircean Themes on the Philosophy of Language, Games, and Communication Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2006. xiv + 496 pp.This compendious volume of fourteen of Pietarinen's essays on Peirce, plus a three-page set of "Final Words" relating to the work of Robert Aumann, is a "must-have" for both the (...) Peirce scholar and any other philosopher who wishes to relate Peirce's thinking on language and logic to other major thinkers and logical themes of the twentieth century (and beyond). The essays extend or complement discussions of Peirce's logic and philosophy of language that have come to be expected from the "Finnish school" of philosophers, which includes Hintikka and Hilpinen, as well as Pietarinen.Nine of the essays (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, and 14), comprising about two-thirds of the entire book, are revised and expanded versions of essays that Pietarinen has previously published. The remaining one-third (approximately) of the book is brand new. Chapters 1 and 2 serve as general introductions to the book's major interests. Chapter 6 is on evidence for constructivism in Peirce, as well as several other topics. Chapter 9 compares Peirce's ideas with Wilfred Hodges's "dialogue foundations" and contains a small philosophical dialogue, which has Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Hodges as its characters. Chapter 11 concerns evolutionary semantics and language [End Page 577] games. And the cursory Chapter 15 of "Final Words" predicts that the game-theoretical approach to semantics and Peirce scholarship has an exploding future, like an erupting volcano.From the foregoing one can gather, correctly, that each essay in the book is separately conceived and that the book is not a single continuous line of argumentative development of one or even of a few themes. Still, the essays are similar to one another in two ways, which ways are closely related to each other. First, they all concern the Peircean doctrine that semeiotic and semeiosis constitute the heartland of logic, and that this heartland is vastly richer than the sort of pure mathematical calculi that might mistakenly be taken for logic itself (and were in fact so taken for much of the twentieth century). Second, they all deal with the Peircean insistence that semeiosis is inherently a form of Praxis in which interchanges occur between or among various "agents" or "actors," one of which might be nature itself; so that at the very least logic is dialogic, and so that more generally one may justifiably speak of semeiosis as involving something like a "game." These lines of exploration will surprise no seasoned Peirce scholar, but the special genius of the Finnish "school" of Peirce interpretation from Hintikka forward is to have spotlighted in dramatic fashion the game-theoretical nature of many elements in Peirce's semeiotic.In these essays Pietarinen amply exhibits two attainments of mind that are indispensable for the serious Peirce scholar. One is the object of what we might call "The Eisele Imperative" after the vehement urgings of Carolyn Eisele: this is the possession of some significant degree of sophistication in mathematics. Pietarinen's mathematical skills are plainly sufficient for his discussions of logic and game theory. For example, his Chapter 5 is an excellent technical discussion of Peirce's existential graphs, and his Chapter 7 is an admirable technical discussion of certain aspects of game theory and generalized quantifiers. Another crucial skill needed by the serious Peirce scholar is the object of what we might call "The Pietarinen Corrective" after the practices exemplified in these essays: this is the possession of extremely broad knowledge of recent and contemporary philosophy, especially philosophy of language, logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science.Indeed, the breadth of Pietarinen's acquaintance with twentieth century logic and philosophy of language, both "analytic" and "continental," is breathtaking. This allows him scope for comparisons of Peirce's views with an extraordinarily wide, and not always easily anticipated, range of philosophers and philosophic traditions. Pietarinen's range of reference is so extensive that it would be pointless to attempt to discuss in... (shrink)

The principal issue around which this anthology is organized is that of the continued relevance of Nietzsche to the so-called post postmodern world, against the backdrop of recent interpretations which claim that Nietzsche’s time has past. For the anthology’s contributors—and thus presumably for its intended readers too—“Nietzsche’s legitimacy as a major intellectual force is no longer questioned”. This judgment is not made in the abstract, however, as if philosophy were an other-worldly enterprise enunciating timeless truths, but in terms of Nietzsche’s (...) relevance in and for our present situation. Yet to judge his legitimacy in this way is already to adopt something of a Nietzschean standpoint. Whereas traditionally the philosophers’ task was to escape in thought from the present situation represented disparagingly as an “apparent” world of conflicting opinions to arrive at the one “true” world, Nietzsche rejects this dichotomy altogether. He does so, however, not on the basis of an abstract argument about the truth itself, but in terms of a reading of the whole tradition according to which in life—as all that really matters—this dichotomy has effectively become “fable.” In the event, intellectual legitimacy turns on the interpretation of what is actually going on in life, interpretations being confirmed or challenged only through other interpretations. Famously, Nietzsche himself proclaims that our present situation is defined by the “death of God” and the advent of nihilism, “this uncanniest of all guests.” Nihilism is “uncanny” on Nietzsche’s diagnosis in that through it “the highest values devalue themselves.” Yet it is also a “guest,” something we have invited into our lives through the valuations we have affirmed in life. Why Nietzsche still?—because since the time Nietzsche announced its arrival, this uncanny guest has moved right in and made itself at home, becoming our effective reality while thwarting all attempts thus far to get it to leave. (shrink)

Although Critchley’s main title promises “very little,” indeed “almost nothing,” his subtitle—“death, philosophy, literature”—announces his grander themes. Critchley’s concern is nothing less than the question of the meaning of human life. At issue is “the radical ungraspability of finitude, our inability to lay hold of death and to make of it a work and to make that work the basis for an affirmation of life”. In addressing this question, Critchley’s premise is the so-called “death of God,” the realization that all (...) attempts to find a redemptive meaning to human life in a divine source or ground outside life and humanity have become untenable. For Critchley, this is at once a personal conviction and a sign of the times, a mark of a ubiquitous nihilism that defines the modern landscape, and which, in its radicalness, puts into question the very meaning of philosophy in its confluence with literature. “For me,” Critchley writes, “philosophy begins from the literal incredibility of the claim [to meaning outside finitude], that the possibility of a belief in God or some God-equivalent, whether vindicated by faith or reason, has decisively broken down. Of course the proper name for this breakdown is modernity and the task of philosophical modernity... is the thinking through of the death of God in terms of the problem of finitude”. He thus claims that “a response to the question of the meaning of life... must be sought within life”. (shrink)

There are experts in arithmetic, music, tennis, and fencing. But are there experts in morality? It is not surprising that there should be people like moral philosophers who are experts in moral theory, just as there are experts in tennis or music theory. But the question concerns whether there are analogues in morality of the expert tennis player or violinist. The unsophisticated answer might be that confessors, counselors, and perhaps even psychiatrists seem to qualify as moral experts in the relevant (...) sense. In turn, most conscientious confessors, counselors, and psychiatrists would deny that they themselves are experts in morality, even though they might claim expertise in divinity, marital advising, or treating emotional disorders. There are, moreover, persuasive philosophical arguments against the possibility of anyone’s being a moral expert, of which certain venerable reasonings of Socrates, Kant, and Ryle may be taken as representative. By examining several venerable arguments against the possibility of moral experts, we will, however, discover much to be said for the unsophisticated answer to the question. (shrink)

In this paper, a game-theoretical semantics is developed for the so-called alpha part of Charles S. Peirce's System of Existential Graphs of 1896. This alpha part is that portion of Peirce's graphs that corresponds to propositional logic. The paper both expounds a game-theoretical semantics for the graphs that seems close to Peirce's own intentions and proves for the alpha part of the graphs that this semantics is adequate.